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CVE-2026-77377: CVE-2026-77377: Authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in Bolt CMS Backend Asynchronous Endpoints

CVE-2026-77377: Authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery in Bolt CMS Backend Asynchronous Endpoints

Vulnerability ID: CVE-2026-77377
CVSS Score: 5.2
Published: 2026-11-20

Bolt CMS (bolt/core) versions prior to 6.1.4 contain a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the authenticated URL-upload (/async/upload-url) and media embed (/async/embed) endpoints. Backend users with file upload or media embedding privileges can supply arbitrary URLs that the application fetches without destination IP validation. This allows authenticated attackers to force the server to initiate HTTP requests to loopback interfaces, RFC 1918 private networks, and cloud instance metadata services.

TL;DR

Authenticated users in Bolt CMS prior to 6.1.4 can trigger Server-Side Request Forgery via the /async/upload-url and /async/embed endpoints to query internal networks and cloud metadata services. Upgrade bolt/core to 6.1.4 or later to enforce scheme and IP address validation via UrlSafetyChecker.


⚠️ Exploit Status: POC

Technical Details

  • Vulnerability Type: CWE-918: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
  • CVSS v3.1 Score: 5.2 Medium (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N)
  • Affected Package: bolt/core (Packagist) < 6.1.4
  • Patched Version: 6.1.4
  • Vulnerable Endpoints: POST /async/upload-url and POST /async/embed
  • Authentication Required: Yes (Backend user with upload or fetch_embed_data permission)
  • Exploit Status: PoC / Regression Test Cases Available
  • CISA KEV Status: Not Listed

Affected Systems

  • Bolt CMS Core (bolt/core) < 6.1.4
  • bolt/core: < 6.1.4 (Fixed in: 6.1.4)

Code Analysis

Commit: 4be8861

Prevent SSRF in upload-from-URL endpoint and introduce Bolt\Utils\UrlSafetyChecker

File: src/Controller/Backend/Async/UploadController.php
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
 use Bolt\Controller\CsrfTrait;
 use Bolt\Factory\MediaFactory;
 use Bolt\Twig\TextExtension;
+use Bolt\Utils\UrlSafetyChecker;
 use Cocur\Slugify\Slugify;
 use Doctrine\ORM\EntityManagerInterface;
 use enshrined\svgSanitize\Sanitizer;
@@ -70,6 +71,18 @@ public function handleURLUpload(Request $request, ValidatorInterface $validator)
             ], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);
         }

+        // Prevent SSRF: only fetch URLs with an allowed scheme that resolve to
+        // a public IP address (not a private, reserved or loopback address).
+        try {
+            UrlSafetyChecker::assertSafe($url);
+        } catch (Throwable $e) {
+            return new JsonResponse([
+                'error' => [
+                    'message' => $e->getMessage(),
+                ],
+            ], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);
+        }
+
         $tmpFolder = $this->getParameter('kernel.cache_dir') . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . 'tmpupload';
         $tmpFile = $tmpFolder . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR . bin2hex(random_bytes(6));
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Commit: c5686bf

Prevent SSRF in embed endpoint and add controller-level SSRF tests

File: src/Controller/Backend/Async/EmbedController.php
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 namespace Bolt\Controller\Backend\Async;

 use Bolt\Controller\CsrfTrait;
+use Bolt\Utils\UrlSafetyChecker;
 use Embed\Embed as EmbedFactory;
 use Psr\Http\Client\RequestExceptionInterface;
 use Symfony\Component\HttpFoundation\JsonResponse;
@@ -13,6 +14,7 @@
 use Symfony\Component\Routing\Attribute\Route;
 use Symfony\Component\Security\Core\Exception\InvalidCsrfTokenException;
 use Symfony\Component\Security\Http\Attribute\IsGranted;
+use Throwable;

 #[IsGranted(attribute: 'fetch_embed_data')]
 class EmbedController implements AsyncZoneInterface
@@ -32,8 +34,21 @@ public function fetchEmbed(Request $request): JsonResponse
             ], Response::HTTP_FORBIDDEN);
         }

+        $url = $request->request->getString('url') ?? '';
+
+        // Prevent SSRF: only fetch URLs with an allowed scheme that resolve to
+        // a public IP address (not a private, reserved or loopback address).
+        try {
+            UrlSafetyChecker::assertSafe($url);
+        } catch (Throwable $e) {
+            return new JsonResponse([
+                'error' => [
+                    'message' => $e->getMessage(),
+                ],
+            ], Response::HTTP_BAD_REQUEST);
+        }
+
         try {
-            $url = $request->request->getString('url') ?? '';
             $info = (new EmbedFactory())->get($url);
             $oembed = $info->getOEmbed();
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Mitigation Strategies

  • Upgrade bolt/core to version 6.1.4 or later to enforce pre-request scheme and public IP validation via UrlSafetyChecker.
  • Enforce IMDSv2 on AWS EC2 instances (HttpTokens=required) or equivalent metadata header protections on GCP/Azure to block unauthenticated GET requests to 169.254.169.254.
  • Implement outbound egress firewall filtering on the application host to block the web server process from connecting to RFC 1918 private networks, loopback ports, and link-local ranges.
  • Audit and restrict Bolt CMS backend user roles in permissions.yaml to minimize the number of accounts granted fetch_embed_data and file upload permissions.

Remediation Steps:

  1. Run 'composer update bolt/core' in the Bolt CMS root directory to install version 6.1.4 or newer.
  2. Confirm the installed package version by running 'composer show bolt/core'.
  3. Clear the Symfony production cache using 'php bin/console cache:clear --env=prod'.
  4. Review web server access logs for historical POST requests to '/async/upload-url' and '/async/embed' from untrusted sessions.

References


Read the full report for CVE-2026-77377 on our website for more details including interactive diagrams and full exploit analysis.

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