The moment a lead form is public, bots start posting to it. In the webhook post I used a shared token, which stops drive-by scripts but not a bot that reads your page source. Here are two free additions that catch almost everything else: a honeypot field and a time trap. No CAPTCHA, no third-party service.
The form side
Add two things to the form from the webhook post:
<form action="YOUR_EXEC_URL" method="POST">
<input name="name" placeholder="Your name">
<input name="email" type="email" required placeholder="[email protected]">
<!-- Honeypot: invisible to humans, irresistible to bots -->
<input name="company" tabindex="-1" autocomplete="off"
aria-hidden="true" style="position:absolute;left:-9999px">
<input type="hidden" name="token" value="change-me">
<input type="hidden" name="t" id="t">
<button type="submit">Send</button>
</form>
<script>
document.getElementById('t').value = Date.now();
</script>
Two details matter. Hide the honeypot with off-screen CSS, not type="hidden", because many bots skip hidden inputs. And give it a tempting name like company or website, since bots fill every field they can see. The aria-hidden and tabindex="-1" keep screen readers and keyboard users out of it.
The script side
Extend the doPost from the webhook post:
const MIN_SECONDS = 3;
function doPost(e) {
const p = e.parameter;
if (p.token !== SECRET) {
return json({ ok: false, error: 'bad token' });
}
// Honeypot: a human never fills this.
if (String(p.company || '') !== '') {
return json({ ok: true }); // pretend it worked, save nothing
}
// Time trap: real people need a few seconds to type an email.
const t = Number(p.t || 0);
if (!t || (Date.now() - t) < MIN_SECONDS * 1000) {
return json({ ok: true }); // same fake success
}
const email = String(p.email || '').trim();
if (!/^[^@\s]+@[^@\s]+\.[^@\s]+$/.test(email)) {
return json({ ok: false, error: 'bad email' });
}
SpreadsheetApp.getActiveSpreadsheet().getSheetByName('Leads')
.appendRow([new Date(), safe(p.name), safe(email), '', '']);
return json({ ok: true });
}
Notice both bot rejections return ok: true. Telling a bot exactly why it failed is free debugging help, so give it a fake win and move on.
Why this works, and where it stops
- Bots fill every field; humans never see the honeypot. That alone catches most form spam.
- Bots submit instantly; humans take a few seconds. The time trap catches the ones clever enough to skip odd fields.
- A determined human spammer still gets through. At lead-form volumes, that is a reply-to-the-weird-email problem, not a code problem.
If you want one more layer, dedupe in the sheet: before appendRow, scan the email column and skip repeats. Keeps the sheet clean when someone double-submits.
Hardening further
Two additions from the comments, thanks to Trung Thanh Tran:
-
tis stamped in the browser, so a bot that reads the page can postt = Date.now() - 10000and pass the time trap. If you serve the form from the same script (doGet+HtmlService), issue the timestamp server-side and sign it:sig = base64( HMAC-SHA256(t, SECRET) ), then verifysigindoPost. Add an upper bound (reject atolder than a few hours) so one captured timestamp cannot be replayed forever. - If you add the email dedupe, wrap the scan and
appendRowinLockService.getScriptLock()- two near-simultaneous submits can otherwise both pass the check and write twice. Wrap only that pair, so concurrent submissions wait on the lock for milliseconds, not for the whole request.
This sits on top of the earlier pieces: the webhook that catches leads, the auto-reply that answers them, and the follow-up for the quiet ones. All of it, plus editable templates and a setup guide, is in the LeadReply Kit. The kit is mock-tested sample code, so read it before pointing it at real leads.
Top comments (4)
Nice, practical setup. One thing worth knowing:
tcomes from the browser, so a bot that reads the page can simply postt = Date.now() - 10000and pass the time trap. If the form page is served by the same script (doGet + HtmlService), you can issue the timestamp server-side with a signature:Adding an upper bound too (reject a
tolder than a few hours) stops a bot from replaying one captured timestamp forever. And if you add the email dedupe, wrap the scan andappendRowinLockService.getScriptLock(), otherwise two near-simultaneous submits can both pass the check.Right - anything stamped client-side can be forged client-side. Serving the form from the same script with doGet + HtmlService so the timestamp is issued and signed server-side is the proper fix, and the expiry bound plus LockService on the dedupe are the details that only bite in production. Adding all three to the post with a credit. Thanks for the careful read.
Thanks, glad it helped. If you add the LockService part, wrapping only the duplicate check and the append in the lock keeps the wait short when several submissions arrive at once.
That is the scope the post now uses - the lock wraps only the scan and the append. I added a line making it explicit: wrap only that pair, so concurrent submissions wait on the lock for milliseconds, not for the whole request. Thanks for the follow-up.