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Khali Sollis
Khali Sollis

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What If the Brain Isn't Running Software?

An MIT theory of analog computation challenges the computer metaphor—and raises difficult questions about intelligence, consciousness, and AI.

You can map every connection in a machine and still misunderstand what the machine is doing.

That would be an inconvenience if the machine were a server. It becomes considerably more interesting when the machine is the human brain.

For decades, neuroscience has treated the brain the way engineers treat an unfamiliar system: trace the wiring, record the signals, build models that predict outputs from inputs. It has worked remarkably well. It also carries a quiet assumption—that the electrical rhythms sweeping across the cortex are mostly traffic between the parts doing the real work.

In August 2026, three neuroscientists at MIT's Picower Institute—Earl K. Miller, Scott L. Brincat, and Jefferson E. Roy—published a review in The Journal of Neuroscience that questions that assumption. Brain waves, they propose, may not merely carry information between computing elements but take part in the computation—and the same dynamics may help explain unified conscious experience.

It is a serious proposal. It is not a proven one. Both facts matter for what follows.

The metaphor that got comfortable

The computer metaphor earned its place. It gave neuroscience a vocabulary—encoding, memory, computation—and gave artificial intelligence one of its founding inspirations.

But every metaphor is an abstraction, and abstractions decide in advance what counts as detail. A digital computer represents information in discrete states, engineered so that the continuous physics underneath stops mattering: small voltage differences within a logic level all read as the same bit. That indifference is what makes digital systems reliable and portable across hardware.

Brains were not engineered for that indifference. Neurons fire discrete spikes, which look pleasingly digital, but they sit in a conductive medium of continuously varying potentials, chemical signals, and rhythms across many scales. "Digital" and "analog" are not two kinds of brain; they are two descriptions, and one system can fit both depending on what you measure. The real question is which description captures what the brain is doing when it thinks.

A rough analogy: digital electronics treats crosstalk and ringing as noise to be engineered away. Miller's group asks whether the brain treats its equivalent as signal. The analogy breaks quickly—nobody designed the cortex—but it captures the shift.

What the MIT researchers are actually proposing

First, the genre. "Analog Cognition and Consciousness" is a review: a theoretical synthesis of prior experimental work, much of it from Miller's lab. It reports no new experiment testing the framework.

The argument begins with something well established. Many neurons in higher cortex respond to mixtures of stimuli, rules, and contexts—a property called mixed selectivity. A 2013 Nature study co-authored by Miller found that such neurons in monkey prefrontal cortex carried distributed information about every task-relevant variable, giving downstream readout a computational advantage. That power creates a coordination problem: if one neuron belongs to many overlapping networks, something must decide which network is active right now—far faster than synapses can be rewired.

The review's answer is brain waves. In the authors' account, slower alpha and beta rhythms, arising from circuits that store goals and memories, regulate faster gamma activity tied to incoming sensory information. The authors describe beta activity as an inhibitory stencil laid across the cortex, marking where incoming signals are suppressed and so where sensory processing can happen. Because these waves travel across the cortex, the control is spatial as well as temporal—what the authors call spatiotemporal computing. Synapses store the representations; wave dynamics help select which ones are active.

The paper uses "analog" in the classical sense: computing with continuous physical quantities that directly represent variables, rather than with binary states. Waves suit this because where they meet, they add, cancel, or form new patterns. In the authors' framing, the way task variables map onto wave geometry specifies the "program." Their illustration is a worked example, not a biological measurement.

Underneath sits ephaptic coupling: electric fields produced by collective neural activity feeding back onto nearby neurons' membrane voltages, no synapse required. This part is not speculation. In rat cortical slices, Costas Anastassiou and colleagues found that extracellular fields shifted membrane potentials by less than half a millivolt yet could strongly entrain spiking, especially at slow frequencies. Flavio Fröhlich and David McCormick showed that weak fields at naturally occurring strengths could entrain network activity in slices. In living animals the evidence is inferential: a 2026 Cerebral Cortex analysis by Dimitris Pinotsis and Miller modeled prefrontal recordings and estimated that field-to-neuron influence exceeded the reverse—a statistical result, not a direct manipulation.

So: mixed selectivity is established, traveling waves are well documented, and ephaptic effects are demonstrated in tissue and supported by modeling in vivo. The review builds a theoretical framework from those findings, but the proposed computational role of wave interference still requires direct testing, and Miller is candid about it. "This is a theory," he told MIT's news office, adding that his lab plans to search brain-wave patterns for signatures of analog computation.

Signal, computation, or both?

The hardest problem for any wave-based theory is that neurons generate the waves. A wave pattern accompanying a task might be doing the work—or be the sound of the work being done.

Skeptics exist. NYU neuroscientist György Buzsáki told Quanta Magazine that waves largely reflect the synaptic activity beneath them: "You don't need anything happening in the extracellular space."

Developers know this shape of problem. A CPU's power draw tracks its workload so closely that side-channel attacks can decode a program from it. Nobody concludes the power trace is executing the code.

Separating correlation from causation requires intervention: perturbing fields while holding synaptic activity as constant as possible, then checking whether computation changes as predicted. Slice experiments have done versions of this; doing it cleanly in a behaving animal is far harder. A hypothetical research question: would disrupting a wave's interference pattern, without silencing the neurons generating it, selectively impair the computation the theory assigns to it?

A simulation is not an explanation

Suppose the theory is correct. A digital computer could almost certainly simulate it; field dynamics are standard numerical fare.

But "reproduce" hides at least four achievements: simulating a process, reproducing its functional organization, reproducing its physical mechanism, and reproducing whatever experience accompanies it. A weather simulation models a hurricane without getting anything wet. That analogy is often used as a knockdown argument against machine consciousness, and it isn't one. Whether consciousness is more like wetness or more like arithmetic is precisely what's disputed.

Serious researchers occupy both positions. A 2023 report led by Patrick Butlin and Robert Long assessed AI systems against "indicator properties" drawn from theories of consciousness, adopting computational functionalism as a working hypothesis. Anil Seth, by contrast, argued in Behavioral and Brain Sciences in 2025 that consciousness may depend on our nature as living organisms.

The MIT theory doesn't settle this; it sharpens it. If part of the computation is carried by field dynamics, whether a simulation of them counts as "the same computation" becomes less a thought experiment and more an engineering spec.

From cognition to consciousness

The review's boldest step is from flexible thought to awareness. Its abstract hedges; its conclusion is firmer, proposing that consciousness emerges when wave dynamics carrying the brain's predictive models organize the cortex into a globally integrated state. Key support comes from anesthesia. In a 2025 Cell Reports study of two monkeys, Miller's lab and anesthesiologist Emery Brown found that ketamine and dexmedetomidine, drugs with very different molecular actions, produced similar shifts in prefrontal phase alignment.

That is evidence about the transition between conscious and unconscious states, not an explanation of why any state feels like something. A marker is not a mechanism, and a mechanism of coordination is not yet an account of experience. That gap—the hard problem—is a philosophical challenge, not a scientific result. It doesn't make investigation impossible; it makes it slow.

The theory enters a crowded room. Global Neuronal Workspace theory (GNWT) holds that information becomes conscious when it ignites and is broadcast across cortical networks. Integrated Information Theory (IIT) ties consciousness to a system's intrinsic cause-effect structure. Neither is settled. In a preregistered adversarial collaboration published in Nature in 2025, IIT's predicted sustained synchronization in posterior cortex did not appear, and neither did GNWT's predicted ignition when a stimulus disappears. A large group of researchers has also argued in Nature Neuroscience that IIT's core claims are untestable in principle, a charge that remains hotly contested.

The MIT authors place themselves in partial agreement with both. Like GNWT, they see consciousness in large-scale cortical integration, but they locate that integration in field interactions rather than broadcasting. Like IIT, they stress organization and self-influence, but they place the mechanism in cortex-wide wave dynamics rather than a posterior "hot zone." That is a real mechanistic disagreement, and a useful one: whether waves replace broadcasting or implement it is something experiments could eventually decide.

Debugging consciousness with the wrong abstraction

Every engineer has met the bug that lives below the abstraction: the race condition that exists only because of timing. The model was right about the logic and wrong about the system.

The opposite mistake is just as common. Good abstractions exist to ignore details that don't matter; an engineer who trusts none of them never ships. The skill is knowing which omitted details matter for the question you're asking.

That's the most useful way to read the MIT proposal. A spike-and-synapse model may predict behavior while missing how the brain coordinates itself in real time; a wave model may explain flexible cognition without explaining experience.

For AI, the lesson cuts several ways. Large language models show that impressive capabilities can emerge from architectures sharing almost nothing with cortical wave dynamics, so capability and biological resemblance can come apart. That says nothing direct about experience; the MIT theory shows neither that such systems are conscious nor that they cannot be. Analog or neuromorphic hardware wouldn't settle it either, because physical resemblance is not the same as having the right properties, whatever those turn out to be.

What would change our minds

The theory makes commitments that can fail. The review predicts, for instance, that prefrontal neurons should be spatially organized by goals and contexts, and that shifts between representations should appear as beta activity moving from one spatial pattern to another. Confirming those would help; targeted field perturbations that alter cognition as predicted would help more. If waves prove to be a faithful readout of synaptic computation with no independent causal role, the analog layer collapses back into a measurement tool.

Even a demonstrated causal role in cognition wouldn't automatically extend to consciousness, and the review offers no predictions specific to experience. Those would need to show that the proposed wave organization tracks experience itself, not just responsiveness, wakefulness, or the capacity to report.

We have mapped the connections, recorded the signals, and built networks that write and debug code. What we haven't settled is which properties of biological computation do the work—and which, if any, make it feel like something to be the machine.

If intelligence can be reproduced in software but experience depends on the physics doing the computing, a system might pass every behavioral test we give it. And we still wouldn't know what, if anything, it experiences.

Sources:

Cell Reports article page https://www.cell.com/cell-reports/fulltext/S2211-1247(25)00456-5

ScienceDirect record https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211124725004565

Top comments (15)

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dpietro profile image
Denise Pietro •

This is a fascinating exploration of how the metaphors we use to understand the brain can sometimes limit the questions we think to ask. The distinction between neural activity carrying information and actively participating in computation is particularly compelling. What I appreciate most is the careful separation between established findings, theoretical interpretation, and what still needs experimental validation. The possibility that brain waves are not merely background signals but essential components of cognitive coordination opens an exciting new direction for neuroscience. An exceptionally thought-provoking article that challenges conventional thinking without overstating the evidence.

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dpietro profile image
Denise Pietro •

One of the most intriguing aspects of this discussion is the distinction between reproducing intelligence and understanding consciousness. We often assume that if a system can reproduce the observable functions of the brain, it must somehow reproduce the underlying experience as well. Yet computation, biological mechanism, and subjective awareness may represent very different levels of explanation. The discussion of analog wave dynamics makes that distinction even more important, particularly as artificial intelligence continues to advance. I especially appreciate that the article doesn't rush toward definitive conclusions but instead identifies the scientific questions that could help distinguish competing explanations. This is precisely the kind of thoughtful, interdisciplinary analysis the conversation about AI and consciousness needs.

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dpietro profile image
Denise Pietro •

What makes this article especially valuable is its willingness to examine not only what a promising scientific theory might explain, but also where its limitations remain. The idea that the brain could use continuous electrical fields and traveling waves as active computational mechanisms challenges our tendency to interpret biological intelligence through the architecture of digital machines. Equally important is the emphasis on causation: observing a wave pattern alongside cognition is not the same as demonstrating that the pattern produces the computation. That scientific distinction deserves attention. I also find the proposed experimental tests particularly exciting because they give the theory opportunities to be challenged and refined. Thank you for presenting such a complex subject with intellectual rigor, clarity, and a refreshing sense of scientific humility.

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Shirley •

The CPU power-draw analogy is the sharpest move in this piece. A wave pattern that tracks the computation closely enough to decode it still doesn’t prove the wave is doing the computing, and you’re right that intervention is the only way out. What I appreciate is that you let the theory stay a theory. The hypothetical experiment, disrupting interference patterns without silencing the neurons that generate them, makes the claim falsifiable, which is exactly where the analog layer either earns its place or collapses back into a measurement tool. Thank you for giving Buzsáki’s skepticism real weight rather than treating it as an obstacle.

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Shirley •

Your four-part breakdown of what “reproduce” could mean (simulating a process, reproducing its functional organization, its physical mechanism, and its experience) is the clearest framing of that debate I’ve seen in a piece this short. I also liked that you declined to use the hurricane analogy as a knockdown argument, since whether consciousness behaves more like wetness or more like arithmetic is the very thing in dispute. The point that field dynamics turn “same computation?” from a thought experiment into an engineering spec is a genuinely useful sharpening. And the closing thought, that a system could pass every behavioral test while we still can’t say what it experiences, lingers.

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Shirley •

The line about the bug that lives below the abstraction, balanced against the engineer who trusts no abstraction and never ships, captures the real tension in this field better than most academic framings. Neuroscience and AI both depend on deciding which omitted details matter for the question being asked, and the MIT proposal is essentially a claim that timing and field effects belong in the model. I appreciated the care in separating what is established (mixed selectivity, traveling waves, ephaptic effects in tissue) from what remains conjecture (the computational role of wave interference, and especially the leap to consciousness). That honesty about evidence levels is rare and makes the piece trustworthy. Excellent work.

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dgold profile image
D. Goldberg •

One of the most fascinating implications of this theory is that it challenges our assumption that computation is independent of the physical substrate performing it. We have become accustomed to thinking of computation as an abstract process that can be transferred between different hardware architectures without fundamentally changing its nature. But what if the brain's electromagnetic environment is not merely supporting computation but actively participating in it? That would introduce an important distinction between reproducing the mathematical behavior of a biological system and reproducing its actual computational dynamics. A digital simulation might perfectly model wave interference, ephaptic coupling, and neural synchronization without physically instantiating those interactions in the same way. This doesn't necessarily mean digital AI cannot be conscious, but it does mean we may be prematurely assuming that functional equivalence automatically implies equivalence of experience. Perhaps the question isn't simply whether machines can think like brains, but whether the physical process through which thinking occurs matters.

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dgold profile image
D. Goldberg •

I find the proposed relationship between brain waves and consciousness particularly interesting because it shifts attention away from individual neurons toward the dynamic relationships between them. Neuroscience has spent enormous effort identifying specialized regions, neural circuits, and information-processing mechanisms. Yet consciousness is not experienced as a collection of independent computations. It is experienced as a unified whole. The idea that traveling waves and phase relationships could dynamically coordinate otherwise distributed neural representations offers an intriguing potential explanation for this unity. It also raises a deeper question: perhaps consciousness depends less on how much information a system processes and more on how that information is integrated, synchronized, and continuously influenced across the system. If so, simply scaling neural networks or increasing their parameter counts may never be sufficient to reproduce the relevant properties of biological cognition. The critical ingredient might be the organization of interactions over time, rather than computational capacity alone.

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dgold profile image
D. Goldberg •

What strikes me most is that this theory could change how we think about the architecture of future AI systems, even if its claims about consciousness ultimately prove incorrect. Modern AI has largely followed the digital computational paradigm: represent information numerically, process it through layers, and optimize the system to produce desired outputs. Biological brains may instead exploit continuous physical dynamics, spatially distributed interactions, and multiple timescales of synchronization as intrinsic computational resources. This suggests an interesting research direction for neuromorphic computing and hybrid analog-digital architectures. Rather than merely building faster versions of conventional neural networks, we could investigate systems in which physical dynamics perform part of the computation themselves. However, I would be careful not to confuse biological inspiration with biological equivalence. Recreating brain-like waves would not establish consciousness any more than reproducing the electrical activity of a heart would establish that a machine is alive. The real breakthrough would be identifying which physical properties are computationally useful, which are necessary for cognition, and whether any are indispensable for subjective experience. That is a much more interesting engineering and scientific challenge than simply asking whether AI can pass as human.

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Oleksandr •

The most valuable idea here isn't whether the theory is ultimately correct, but the distinction between a model that predicts behavior and a model that explains the mechanism.

It's entirely possible to have a useful abstraction that succeeds for decades and still discover later that it was hiding an important layer of the system. That's what makes these kinds of theories worth testing rather than dismissing outright. 👍

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N. C. •

What I valued most is how carefully you kept the evidence tiers apart. Mixed selectivity is established, traveling waves are well documented, ephaptic effects are demonstrated in slices, and the computational role of wave interference is still a theory. That ladder is exactly what a topic this seductive needs. Your CPU power-draw analogy also captures the central difficulty better than most neuroscience write-ups do: a signal that tracks the computation so closely is not necessarily performing it. Buzsáki’s skepticism and the proposed intervention test, disrupting the interference pattern without silencing the neurons that generate it, show what a falsifiable version of this claim would look like. It is rare to see an article on consciousness say plainly that a marker is not a mechanism. Thank you for writing something this rigorous and readable.

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n_c_e4a8149b59e51d8be77 profile image
N. C. •

The distinction between simulating a process, reproducing its functional organization, reproducing its physical mechanism, and reproducing the experience that accompanies it is the part I will be thinking about longest. The weather-simulation analogy is usually wielded as a knockdown argument, and you rightly note that it presupposes the very thing in dispute: whether consciousness is more like wetness or more like arithmetic. I also liked the framing that if field dynamics carry part of the computation, the question of whether a simulation counts as “the same computation” becomes less a thought experiment and more an engineering spec. Your closing image, a system that passes every behavioral test while we still cannot say what, if anything, it experiences, is a sobering place to land for anyone working on AI. A question for you: do you think the Butlin and Long indicator-property approach would need to change if wave dynamics turn out to be causally essential, or would it simply become another property to check for?

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AJ •

What I appreciate most here is the distinction between challenging an abstraction and abandoning computation altogether. “The brain isn’t running software” need not mean that cognition is beyond computational explanation. It could mean that the separation between program, processor, and communication medium is the wrong starting point. In the framework you describe, the activity of the system helps determine which interactions are possible next—the “execution” partly configures the machine doing the executing.

That makes the most interesting question, to me, not “analog or digital?” but “which causal relationships must an adequate model preserve?” If wave dynamics merely summarize what synaptic networks are already doing, they may offer a useful description without requiring a fundamentally different computational account. If they feed back into those networks in a task-specific way, however, leaving them out could mean omitting part of the mechanism rather than simplifying its implementation.

The anesthesia findings add an important wrinkle. The cited study did not find a simple disappearance of synchrony: both drugs increased low-frequency phase locking, while neighboring prefrontal regions became less phase-aligned and corresponding regions across hemispheres became more aligned. That makes “more synchronization means more consciousness” an inadequate summary of these results. The relevant feature may be the organization of coordination, not its overall amount. cell

I would also sharpen the proposed experimental test slightly: showing that an electric-field perturbation changes behavior would establish influence, but not necessarily the specific analog computation being proposed. A stronger test would derive a prediction from the proposed wave geometry—this phase shift should selectively disrupt this operation—and compare it against a competing account that does not assign a computational role to extracellular fields. Ideally, restoring the predicted pattern would rescue the operation. That would help distinguish a mechanism with explanatory power from another variable capable of disturbing a complicated system.

For AI, your distinction between simulation, functional organization, physical mechanism, and experience is the crucial safeguard. A digital simulation could undermine the claim that biological hardware is necessary for a capability without settling whether it is necessary for experience. Conversely, demonstrating that fields matter in brains would not, by itself, establish that artificial systems need the same fields.

The productive takeaway is neither “brains are just computers” nor “brains transcend computation.” It is that we should specify what our computational descriptions leave out, then ask whether those omissions change the system’s causal capacities. The possibility that the abstraction boundary itself needs revising is interesting enough without treating it as a solution to consciousness.

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Rosana •

This is such an insightful and beautifully articulated piece. What resonates most is the idea that conviction and intellectual rigidity can look remarkably alike, even though one is rooted in principle and the other in self-protection. I especially appreciate the reminder that changing our minds should be seen as an expression of growth, not a confession of weakness. The real test of open-mindedness isn't how well we challenge other people's beliefs, but whether we're willing to examine our own when uncomfortable evidence appears. A powerful reflection on the humility required to keep learning. Outstanding work!

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Rosana •

A wonderfully thought-provoking essay, and one that feels particularly relevant to the way we navigate disagreement today. The bridge analogy captures something important: when defending our positions becomes more important than solving the problem, even reasonable people can become obstacles to progress. I also love the distinction between remaining open-minded and remaining endlessly undecided. We need conviction to make difficult choices, but we also need the humility to recognize when new evidence calls for a different direction. Perhaps the greatest sign of wisdom isn't never being wrong, but creating the space—in ourselves and in society—to acknowledge it, learn, and move forward. Beautifully written and deeply worthwhile!